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WHY IS KILLING MORALLY WRONG?
Nathan Tamblyn

Abstract: Death is not an intrinsic evil. Death does not harm its victim. This article proposes an alternative Buddhist answer to why killing is wrong: because it harms the killer.
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For most people it is obvious that killing is wrong. It is harder to explain why killing is wrong. The purpose of this article is to present a Buddhist answer. Killing is wrong because of the harm it causes to the killer. As the explanation unfolds, we shall also consider other views for why killing is wrong, to show how a Buddhist approach interacts with them. In particular, we shall consider the claims that death is an intrinsic evil, and that killing harms the victim.

1. DEATH AND INRINSIC EVIL

The following account draws heavily on the philosophy of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Buddhism.​[1]​
	First, nothing has inherent substance. In other words, nothing has fixed content. Everything consists of ingredients which are ever-changing. This is true for everything, including people. What we call our ‘self’ is merely a handy conceptual label for a collection of changing physical processes and mental states. For example, we acknowledge the regular changes within us when we talk about circadian biorhythms. This is not to say that we are radically different one moment to the next. There is a continuum. It is a bit like the familiar philosophical puzzle: if we take the Argo and replace a plank every day, at what point is it no longer Jason’s ship? A Buddhist answer would be that we can give it the label ‘Jason’s ship’ if that is convenient, as long as we appreciate that the ship is changing in subtle ways moment by moment. Sometimes the pace of change is slow and barely noticeable to us, like the drifting of continents. Sometimes the pace of change is fast, like when we get caught unexpectedly in a rain shower. But we are always changing, sometimes faster, sometimes slower. There is no permanent core.​[2]​
	The fact of change is of central importance when it comes to the experience of happiness. Every experience consists of its ingredients. If I go to the park today and see a tree in blossom, it might make me happy. If I go to the same spot tomorrow, the experience will be different. The sun might be brighter, or there might be clouds, the wind might have picked up, or perhaps it is rainy, there might be noise from other people, or the blossom might have dropped off. Moreover, one ingredient in every experience which I have, is me. Though I go to the same spot in the park, my mood and thoughts might be different, I might be hungry or thirsty, or I might be filled with an anticipation which previously I did not have. More fundamentally, I am guaranteed to be different in at least one way: I will be more experienced tomorrow than I am today.
	Consider another example. If someone tells us a joke, we might laugh. But we do not laugh forever. Eventually the laughter subsides. Whatever other ingredients of the experience have altered, we too have changed: we have heard the joke. Thus every new experience is also its own end, simply by virtue of changing one of its ingredients, us, by making us more experienced.
	This matters if we think that happiness can be permanent. If we think that, by going back to the same spot in the park, or hearing the same joke, we will be happy exactly like before, we will be disappointed. Perhaps it still makes us happy, but it will be a different happiness, more or less marked. Better to be differently happy, than differently happy yet disappointed. Or perhaps for some reason this time we feel sad. Better to be sad, than sad and also disappointed. This extra disappointment is the needless suffering which comes from us falsely grasping after a permanence which is not there. And yet we hear this all the time: ‘if only I could get X, then I would be happy’. We might well be happy upon getting X, but the happiness cannot last, and if we wrongly thought it would last, we will be the cause of our own suffering of disappointment.
	Worse still, grasping after a permanence which is not there is not only delusional, it is also good practice at grasping. If we learn the piano, and practice regularly, then day by day we become more proficient until the notes come naturally. If every day we practice grasping, then we become readier to do it and more adept at it, until it becomes second nature. This is one of the ways to understand karma.​[3]​ Karma is about us taking responsibility for our emotional welfare by understanding that our choices condition our future experiences. If we react to an event with anger, and allow that anger to remain, when instead we might have let it go, then we are a cause of us now being angry. And reacting this time with anger is good practice for reacting next time with anger, and so we make it more likely that anger features in our future experiences as well. We might instead cultivate a reaction of compassion, which makes it more likely that our futures will be filled with compassion (rather than anger).
	In similar vein, perhaps, Gandhi said that there is a connection between means and ends. The ends achieved are conditioned by the means adopted. If we build a house with cheap materials, we end up with a flimsy house. Or as he put it, wanting to take revenge only ends up disturbing our own peace.​[4]​
	So nothing has inherent substance. Further, nothing has inherent value either. Partly this is a consequence of things having no fixed content: there is no permanent ingredient whose persistent presence provides the value. Partly this is because good and bad are merely conceptual labels which we attach to circumstances which themselves are constantly changing. Which is another way of saying that good and bad depends on variable context. It is a bit like the folk tale of the farmer whose son finds a horse in the fields. ‘That’s good’, say the neighbours. ‘We’ll see’, says the farmer. The son rides the horse and falls off, breaking his leg. ‘That’s bad’, say the neighbours. ‘We’ll see’, says the farmer. The son goes to hospital where he falls in love with the nurse and they plan to marry. ‘That’s good’, say the neighbours. ‘We’ll see’, says the farmer…
Not only do good and bad depend on ever-changing context, they also depend on each other. This is the case for every pair of conceptual opposites. As Nāgārjuna says, ‘difference does not exist without the one from which it differs’.​[5]​ If nothing was high, then nothing would be low, and everything would be flat, and we would not notice because we would not know any different. If nothing was good, then nothing would be bad, everything would be as it is, a monochrome we would not perceive for the lack of any contrast. ‘Bad’ is not an intrinsic condition, but a relative judgment.
But isn’t death intrinsically bad? To my mind, Nagel puts this position most attractively (and concisely). He says that life is a good thing, so death is a bad thing for bringing life to an end. Death is an intrinsic evil.​[6]​ It follows that killing could be morally discoloured by the intrinsic evil it brings. But it also raises something of a paradox, as Kamm points out. The better our life, the worse is death for ending it. But surely we want a better life, even though that makes death worse? Making our life as bad as possible might greatly lessen the sting of death, but that seems madness.​[7]​
The paradox indicates an error. The mistake here is thinking that life is something separate from death, whereas they are two sides of the same coin. Without death, life would not be good, it would be unremarkable, a permanent state of affairs we would not appreciate due to the absence of anything not-life to compare it to. Put another way, if life is what makes death bad, then death is what makes life good, each dependent on the other in a continuous circle. We cannot break that circle and claim that death, by itself, is intrinsically bad. Death without life would be meaningless.​[8]​
This also means that killing is not inherently bad, because nothing is inherently bad. A moment’s reflection shows that this is not so surprising after all. For a start: we kill plants every day for food; we kill parasites and infections; we kill pests which spread disease. And even when it comes to killing people, our judgments reflect the importance of context. For example: self-defence can justify killing; it is lawful to separate conjoined twins for the benefit of one even though the other will die as a consequence;​[9]​ it can be lawful for a doctor to administer strong painkillers even though this accelerates the patient’s death.​[10]​ 

2. DEATH AND HARM TO THE VICTIM

So death is not intrinsically evil, and killing is not inherently bad. Another answer to why killing is wrong focuses on the harm which death is said to cause the victim. Harm to others takes a central role in liberal thinking. Mill said that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.​[11]​ Taking this ‘harm principle’ as his starting point, Feinberg asks, what sorts of conduct may the state rightly make criminal? He says that there can be no controversy about the criminalization of wilful homicide, a crime everywhere in the civilized world because it is a direct production of serious harm to the victim.​[12]​ Although, as Cooney says, this high-minded principle has only one enemy: reality. The most striking feature of human killing, he says, is the sheer variability of responses it evokes, from ignoring it, to capital punishment.​[13]​
Let us accept that it is wrong to harm other people. But in what way is a person harmed by death? Here is a range of representative answers. Killing is wrong because it precludes the victim’s future happiness; or because it thwarts the future fulfilment of the victim’s current preferences, including the desire to continue living; or because it fails to respect the victim’s autonomy, by taking an important decision for him, and precluding any further decisions.​[14]​ Or because it interrupts a developing biographical process, as the victim sought to shape his own life in his own individual way.​[15]​ In other words, what matters most, according to answers like these, is the victim’s happiness or preference or autonomy; and killing precludes them.
But Epicurus raised the following challenge.​[16]​ When we are alive, necessarily we are not suffering from death. And when we are dead, we cannot suffer anything, because we no longer exist to notice. So death itself (as distinct from the process of dying) cannot harm its victim. If Epicurus is right (and we shall return to this shortly), and if death cannot harm its victim, all that remains of the answers above is harm to happiness or preference or autonomy per se. This stance is problematic.
First, happiness cannot be physically harmed because it is an intangible concept. Second, the experience of happiness can be diminished, but that requires there to be a person who is having the experience. Similarly, in a Buddhist context, Williams has argued that there cannot be pain without a person to feel it.​[17]​ But a person who is dead is not experiencing less happiness; he does not exist to have any experience at all. Third, all this tends towards the claim that happiness is a thing and that its value can be diminished, which makes the mistake (discussed above) of attributing to it both inherent substance and value. 
Let us explore this latter point again, but from another angle. Happiness is merely a concept. The word remains the same, but it stands as a three-syllable shorthand for an infinite range of transient experiences made up of ever-changing ingredients. The word expresses a felicitous state of affairs, but only by abstracting to a very high level of generality. For example, we all understand what is meant by the word ‘tree’, but that one word fails to tell us how tall it is, whether it has leaves, and if so what colour, whether it has any flowers, and if so how they smell, its age, whether it stands alone or in company, and so on. There is truth in the saying ‘a picture paints a thousand words’; that is how imprecise words can be. So too ‘happiness’ is a useful word for concise communication, but no two experiences of happiness are ever precisely alike. And while the word is always available for use, happiness is not a thing we can grab hold of and keep. We cannot pin a label on a flow of water. So too there is nothing fixed in happiness to stick value on. 
But isn’t happiness good? That is the basis of most utilitarian thinking. Certainly we like happiness. That is what makes it happy. Although it can be more or less fitting: happiness at a birthday party is appropriate, whereas happiness at a funeral is usually less well received. But it isn’t good or bad, just happy. As discussed above, ‘good’ is not an intrinsic condition, but a relative judgment, here made of an experience which is unique, impermanent, and transmuting into something else – which at some point will have to be sadness, if we are ever to know happiness by the contrast. Consider this analogy. Radios pick up radio waves. We might prefer one radio station over another, but there is nothing inherently wrong with any of the radio waves themselves, let alone the radio for picking them up. Happiness and sadness are experiences like any other, not good or bad, just happy or sad, and we are simply attuned to receive them as part of our nature.
So in short, any answer which says that killing is wrong because it reduces happiness per se is misguided for reifying happiness and projecting onto it inherent substance and value, two things it cannot have.
Is Epicurus right? Let us consider two prominent challenges. 
First, Broome says that death does harm its victim after all, and that we can measure the harm of death by comparing the goodness of the shorter life the victim had, against the goodness of the longer life he would have had.​[18]​ How to value that goodness? Broome suggests that something benefits me if it makes my life better than it would have been, and harms me if it makes my life worse than it would have been. But this approach causes problems. 
For example, the lottery results were announced today. I did not win. Have I been harmed? If we compare my life as it is, against the life I would have had, had I won the lottery, then presumably I have been harmed. In which case, I am harmed every moment, as good things, which could happen to me, do not happen to me. Then again, I suppose I am benefited every moment, as bad things, which could happen to me, do not happen to me. So I am continuously harmed and benefited, by an infinite variety of things which could happen to me, but do not. This picture is implausible.
Instead, I suggest that something benefits me if it makes my life better than it was previously. If I win the lottery, I am benefitted for being better off than I was before I won. If I do not win, I am not harmed, because I am no worse off (beyond the cost of the ticket). If I die, am I worse off? No. Death does not make my life better or worse. It makes me dead, without life at all. Once dead, I do not exist to suffer either benefit or harm.
Incidentally, both Broome and Nagel say things like ‘if he had not died, he would be alive’. That is precisely what life and death mean. But it should not be taken as proof that the dead person has lost his future, ie a future which was somehow already his, guaranteed to him. Futures are contingent. They are hypothetical. They are speculation. To say that someone loses their future is tantamount to assuming an allocated life-span – in which case, surely death is the confirmation of that allocation. Now the law does award future losses for personal injury, but that is simply for the convenience of the claimant not returning to court every year to say ‘now my losses include this too’. Future losses are compensated by a lump sum payment which brings an end to the litigation once and for all. They are statistical predictions, nothing more. ‘There is really one certainty: the future will prove the award to be either too high or too low.’​[19]​
A second challenge to Epicurus suggests that death causes the victim retroactive harm. For example, Luper discusses the following scenario.​[20]​ Imagine a scientist whose life has been dedicated to finding a cure to an illness. He dies. But his work inspires a colleague to find that cure. This validates his life. Or his research is lost in a fire. This harms his life retroactively.
But this explanation is inaccurate. Whether or not the scientist’s work is lost in a fire will determine how future generations assess his reputation in his field of research. But when their judgment comes in, the scientist will not care, because he will be too dead to notice. While alive, perhaps the scientist is anxious about his future reputation. But that anxiety will never be over-written. If he is celebrated one hundred years hence, he will not know, and it does not alter the fact that he is anxious now. Nothing is happening retroactively to the scientist himself.
Kamm raises a related point in this context which feeds back to our earlier discussion about whether death is an intrinsic evil. If a dead person’s good reputation can somehow be said to be a benefit for him, then he might amass more goods while being dead than while he was alive.​[21]​ Death might be a very beneficial state. Look how much good death has done Mozart! If this assessment seems counter-intuitive, it confirms that there must be an error in the thinking.
So, in my view, the challenges to Epicurus do not hold out. Death itself cannot harm us, because when it comes, there is no ‘us’ to suffer harm. Fear of death might tax us while alive. But then it is not death itself, but fear of death, which causes the harm. And as Epicurus points out, this fear is irrational: until death comes, it has not harmed us, because we are still alive; and when it comes, we will be too dead to notice. And if death itself causes the victim no harm, this leaves the answers considered in this section to why killing is wrong sounding implausible: without identifying any person who suffers as a result of death, instead they lament harm to happiness itself, thereby attributing to it both inherent substance and inherent value, false views which lead to suffering in those who hold them.

3. KILLING AND THE SOCIAL COVENANT

Hart said that there are some obvious truisms about human nature and the world: people are vulnerable, have limited altruism, and limited strength of will not to prefer their own immediate self-interests. Reflecting upon this, he says, we can identify certain rules of conduct which a society must subscribe to if it is to be viable. This includes rules against physical violence to the person.​[22]​
	Ewin says that a rule against killing, like a rule to drive on the left, has no moral value as an isolated instance, but its value becomes clear when everyone does it. So in Hobbesian vein, he says, we enter into a social covenant, including not to kill, to protect our lives, and make them more enjoyable through security of possessions and so on. In that way, he says, a rule against killing is constitutive of morality.​[23]​
	What these two representative positions have in common is an acceptance that killing is not necessarily wrong in itself, but that it must be restricted if we want to live in a society. Let us accept that society is a good thing. There are many things which, in theory, could threaten society. If we were to kill ourselves, that could preclude a lasting society. Suicide used to be a crime. Now it is no longer a crime. We can kill ourselves, but most of us do not, and society has not collapsed now that suicide is lawful. We can kill others, but would most of us do that if there were no law against murder? Of course there would be killings. There are murders even now when we have a law against it, and yet society persists. 
I suggest that, although we can kill others, most of us would not, even without a law against murder. In which case, the rule against killing is not necessary, because society would persist anyway. This is an empirical claim, but so too is the claim that we need a rule against killing otherwise society will collapse. In my corner, there is a body of anthropological research of ‘peaceful’ societies which shows that aggression and violence are not hard-wired into our natures, ie they are not something which necessarily the bonds of society must overcome.​[24]​
If most of us would not kill anyway, just like most of us would not commit suicide, even though we can, then, following Hart and Ewin, we do not need the rule in order to form a society. And if a rule against killing forms no part of the social covenant, continuing their argument, then it has no moral content, we could kill without moral qualms. Which leads us to this result: because most of us would not do it, that very fact makes it morally permissible! That counter-intuitive conclusion suggests the inadequacy of the underlying theory. 




4. KILLING AND HARM TO THE KILLER

Killing is morally wrong because of the harm it causes the killer. My principal argument will draw on Buddhist thought. But corroboration for the conclusion can also be found in Aristotle. This is reassuring because Keown says that virtue theories like Aristotle are the closest Western correlate to Buddhism.​[25]​ 
Aristotle’s ethics might be summarized as follows.​[26]​ For Aristotle, the highest good is eudaimonia, ie well-being or flourishing. To achieve this, we must live well, and as humans that consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue. Why? Our capacity for reason is what makes us distinctly human. And doing anything well, including using our reason, means acting in accordance with virtue. As for virtue, it is an intermediate condition, a middle way between excess and deficiency. It is a question of responding in proportion to the situation. It is about behaving ‘just right’. 
Aristotle says that murder is always wrong.​[27]​ He says nothing about harm to the victim. Instead, it is wrong because it is always an extreme act. He says that it is not an act which admits of a mean or middle way. What is wrong with murder is its extreme nature, and extremes are not virtuous, and without virtue we fail to achieve our highest good. Thus to commit murder is wrong because the murderer fails to act with virtue, and so fails to achieve his own flourishing – the murderer harms himself.
Now let us consider a Buddhist argument for why killing harms the killer. We saw earlier how projecting inherent substance and inherent value onto phenomena is the primary cause of suffering. It follows that a correct view of phenomena as empty of inherent substance and value extinguishes suffering. Why? If we know that nothing is inherently good to keep even if we could, and that everything is transient anyway and its passing not inherently bad, then we can let go without grasping or disappointment. And the more we forego grasping in favour of enlightened acceptance, the calmer our whole life. Instead, we simply experience the transient ebb and flow of existence as it comes.​[28]​ 
Thus at a fundamental level, empty of inherent value, all we have is life laid bare, the pure fact of our existence, not good, but a miracle beyond good and bad, an impermanent progress of transient experiences. The realization of this leads to a dawning fellowship with all life. Wanton killing distances us from the truth of our reality; indeed, it tends to deny it. Gaita puts the latter point this way. Often when we do something wrong, we suffer remorse. The shock of the recognition in remorse of what we have become is the shock of the acknowledgment of the sacred in ourselves and in our victims.​[29]​
Not only that, but, once again, any experience in life consists of its ingredients. In particular, other life, other people, are ingredients in our experience of life from moment to moment. From the ‘Flower Garland Sutra’ (Avataṃsaka Sūtra) we have the story of Indra’s net. Indra is a god who lives in a palace. There hangs a net which extends in all directions to infinity. At each knot there is a multi-faceted jewel. The net sparkles with brilliance. Each jewel reflects all the others, which in turn are reflecting it and all the others, an infinite accumulation of reflections. So too are our relations with other people.
For example, most of us have been stuck on public transport next to a crying baby. That child is an ingredient in our experience. His wails fray our nerves and jangle our bones. How we allow ourselves to react to that child also conditions our experience. If we react with irritation, then we have crying and irritation. What is more, our response becomes an ingredient in the experience which the child is having too – and his mother. It makes her more agitated and desperate. So now we have an environment of crying and irritation and agitation. And so it carries on, with everyone on that bus reacting and counter-reacting, each person an ingredient in every other person’s experience at that moment. 
All of which is another way of saying that our individual experiences of life are all inter-dependent. So when we kill other life, we kill an ingredient in our experience, we introduce killing and death as an ingredient into our own life. Our experience of living becomes death, at least in part. What is more, this is so contrary to the pure fact of existence that is constitutive of our nature that the shock waves are likely to be significant. This is not to say that the effects must be immediate and apparent. If we eat an unhealthy diet, it might be years before we suffer diabetes and heart disease. Those are serious health complications, the accumulation of years of bad practice. So too are the effects of living at odds with our reality. For example, is it any wonder that soldiers are so prone to suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder?​[30]​ Although few civilians kill, yet killing is often a large part of our lives, through movies or newspapers or diet.
We can approach the matter from yet another angle. Buddhism advises us to be compassionate. This is because compassion, we are told, is a direct and effective means to salvation.​[31]​ One explanation is that it brings us closer to realizing that life, laid bare, is all we have. What is more, a Buddha is naturally compassionate, seeing life clearly for what it is. Keown says that Buddhism, similarly to virtue ethics, is a project of personality transformation. It is about replacing negative habits with positive and beneficial ones. The better our habits and the more we emulate our role model, the more we become our role model.​[32]​ So we begin by nurturing compassion, which is a path to enlightenment, and modelled on the example of a Buddha, and by the end point of enlightenment, compassion has become, or comes as, second nature. 
In contrast, if we fail to act with compassion, for example through wanton killing, we stray further from the path of a Buddha. We become ever less compassionate with the practice, in a vicious karmic circle. All of which makes it less likely we will achieve enlightenment. We will fail to appreciate either life as it is or the inter-dependence of life. Our mistreatment of others only makes that mistreatment a part of our own lives. Even worse if we behave this way in pursuit of values which turn out to be empty, and experiences which reveal themselves to be impermanent.
Does this mean that morality is selfish? Are the reasons for moral behaviour all prudential, simply to avoid our own suffering? If so, this criticism impugns any moral philosophy which holds out some sense of spiritual fulfilment to the practitioner. And yes, this is about ending suffering in our own lives. But Buddhism seeks to end suffering by indicating what behaviour is appropriate in our dealings with ourselves and with other people. Keown says that Buddhism is both egotistic and altruistic in the sense that it sees moral conduct as leading simultaneously to the good of oneself and others.​[33]​ Our best interests are served by being compassionate towards others because all life is inter-dependent. Buddhism cannot be about selfish gratification when it has this other-regarding element necessarily built in.​[34]​
How can we prove the Buddhist claims in favour of compassion? Keown says that Buddhist literature tells us what is moral, without telling us why – which he puts down to the cultural, especially political, conditions in which early Buddhism developed.​[35]​ Huntington too says that there is ultimately no objective justification for following the Buddha path.​[36]​ However, we have just given an explanation of why compassion might naturally arise when we see all life as inter-dependent. The final proof must be rooted in experience. It is not enough to understand the argument intellectually, we must realize it as a living truth and put it into practice – and the proof will be the experience we reap.​[37]​ From the very beginning, Buddha enjoined us to try it for ourselves rather than take his word for it.
This does not divorce Buddhism from Western standards of philosophy. For a start, Huntington says that modern schools of pragmatist and deconstructive philosophy also seek to break down, simply so that we can experience what is left behind.​[38]​ And even constructive schools of thought eventually come to rest on an insight or assumption which also cannot be proven. For example, Singer, an avowed and persuasive utilitarian, acknowledges that it cannot be proven that we should all be utilitarians.​[39]​ But if the idea of maximizing happiness appeals to you, try it out and see where it takes you.
There are three final issues I wish to discuss.
First, is it worse to kill a human rather than an animal? For those who think so, the above approach offers another reason why. Compassion, in terms of sympathy and respect for life, should be far more accessible when considering human life, simply because we ourselves are human. It involves far less imagination than sympathizing with other forms of life. Compassion towards humans should be easier to grasp; a failure of compassion towards humans is a greater falling short, and more keenly felt.
But killing anything unnecessarily is morally wrong. It is always a failure of compassion to take life unnecessarily. (That would include plants; avoiding injury to plants is also a moral precept in Buddhism.) This has a practical consequence in terms of what we eat. We need to eat, so some killing is necessary in this regard. But eating animals usually involves unnecessary killing. Consider the following two food chains which we create through farming: first, plants are killed to feed animals which are killed to feed humans; second, fewer plants are killed to feed humans.​[40]​ Which food chain involves less killing? Obviously, the second one. We should position ourselves on the shortest possible food chain to avoid unnecessary killing. And most of us can do this, because we do not need meat for a healthy diet.
Second, the grounding presumption of Buddhism is that life entails suffering. Thus the reason to behave morally at all is not principally for fear of human punishment, nor for fear of divine retribution, but to seek an end to suffering. This depends on you wanting to extinguish suffering. (Nirvāṇa is literally an extinguishing. It is not a heaven of permanent happiness. Happiness cannot be permanent.) Buddhism assumes you do want this. Epicurus too assumes you want an end to anxiety (ataraxy). Aristotle assumes you want to flourish (eudaimonia). Otherwise you would not be reading them.
There may be killers who do not care about moral values or suffering or human punishment. While this persists, they are not the target audience for Buddhism, or virtue ethics, or utilitarianism, or any moral philosophy. With some people, there cannot be any dialogue, at least for a time. In other words, labelling their conduct immoral is pointless as regards them. They will not care. To them, the label is meaningless. It might indirectly express what the consequences for us would have been, in their shoes. But we cannot force other people to behave morally as regards their own internal dispositions.
In this regard, I would describe my approach here to the morality of killing as an example of ‘conditional morality’ (or in Kantian language, a hypothetical imperative). With moral absolutism, the claim is that X is the right thing to do in all times and places and for all people. With moral relativism, the claim is that X is the right thing to do in some times and places and for some people, but not others. With conditional morality, the claim is that if you want to achieve N, then X is always the right thing to do; but only you can decide whether or not you want to achieve N. Do you want an end to existential suffering? Then a prohibition of wanton killing is necessary.




Death is not an intrinsic evil. The claim that life is good, and death is bad for ending it, fails to understand how radically inter-dependent those concepts are. Life is only notable as a state because it is marked out by its comparison with death. Life needs death to be cognizable. And if life is what makes death bad, then death is what makes life good, each dependent on the other in a continuous circle. We cannot break that circle and claim that death, by itself, is intrinsically bad. Death without life would be meaningless.
	Death does not harm its victim. While alive, we are not suffering from death; when it comes, we will be too dead to notice. We do not suffer any reduction in happiness or autonomy, because there is no ‘we’ after death to suffer anything at all. Nor is it helpful to say that death causes a reduction in happiness per se. That makes the mistake of projecting inherent substance and value onto happiness. That is a serious mistake: it deceives us into thinking that happiness has a core we can grasp hold of, something permanent to pin value on. We then become the cause of our own disappointment when happiness inevitably ebbs away, a transient experience made up of ever-changing ingredients, not inherently good or bad, just happy and impermanent.
At a fundamental level, empty of inherent value, all we have is life laid bare, the pure fact of our existence. It is something we share with anything else that lives. Wanton killing, ie killing needlessly and without compassion, distances us from this realization; indeed, it tends to deny it. It also fails to appreciate the inter-dependence of life; our mistreatment of others only makes that mistreatment a part of our own lives. We risk becoming ever less compassionate with the practice, in a vicious karmic circle. Even worse if we behave this way in pursuit of values which turn out to be empty, and experiences which reveal themselves to be impermanent. Instead, if we act with compassion, we set ourselves upon an upward spiral, a virtuous path which aims to extinguish the suffering in our lives by revealing to us the true nature of reality. And all this will matter – ie the prohibition of killing will be a moral injunction – to anyone wanting to end such suffering.
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